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The Restructuring and Privatisation  
of British Rail: Was it really that bad? 
 
 
MICHAEL G. POLLITT and ANDREW S. J. SMITH*
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper uses a social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) framework to assess whether rail 
privatisation in Britain has produced savings in operating costs. The paper shows that 
major efficiencies have been achieved, consumers have benefited through lower prices, 
whilst the increased government subsidy has been largely recouped through privatisation 
proceeds. We also find that output quality is no lower (and is probably better) than under 
the counterfactual scenario of public ownership (pre-Hatfield). The achievement of 
further savings is key to delivering improved rail services in the future. This paper finds 
that a privatised structure, where shareholders demand a return on their investment, has 
led to significant improvements in operating efficiency - it remains to be seen whether the 
new regime, with a not-for-profit infrastructure owner, will deliver the same efficiency 
improvements.  
 
 
JEL classification: H43, L92. 
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I: Introduction 
 
Over the period 1994-1997 the British railway industry was fundamentally transformed. 
In 1994 the industry was in the hands of a single, vertically-integrated operator - British 
Rail - owned by the government. By 1997, BR’s activities had been transferred to the 
private sector. In the process, the industry was restructured into more than one hundred 
companies, thereby removing much of the vertical and horizontal integration of the pre-
privatisation structure.  
Since its reorganisation, and subsequent transfer to the private sector, the rail 
industry's outputs have grown sharply. Between 1992/93 (the last year before 
restructuring began1) and 1999/00, passenger miles and freight tonne-miles grew by 21% 
and 19% respectively, whilst train miles were also up significantly (passenger train miles 
grew by 13% over the period). During this same period, total industry operating costs2 
fell by nearly 6%, suggesting that significant efficiency improvements have been made. 
However, the privatisation of British Rail has been the subject of much criticism in 
recent years, particularly in the aftermath of the Hatfield accident3. In October 2001 the 
Government announced that it had decided to put Railtrack into administration – with the 
company to be replaced by a not-for-profit company, limited by guarantee. Railtrack’s 
finances had been crippled by the cost of Hatfield, and cost over-runs on the West Coast 
Main Line project4.  
                                                 
1
 See Section III.2 (a). 
2
 Operating costs (excluding depreciation). 
3
 A train derailment resulting from defective track, which resulted in four people being killed.  
4
 The renewal and enhancement of Britain’s West Coast Main Line (linking London and Glasgow in 
Scotland).  
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In the aftermath of the government’s announcement, attention has focused on what 
went wrong with privatisation, and how crucial investment for maintenance and 
development of the network will be financed in future. This paper looks at whether the 
restructuring and privatisation of British Rail has produced savings in operating costs, 
relative to the counterfactual scenario of continued public ownership. Operating costs 
include train operator costs (train crews; traction costs; maintenance and cleaning of 
rolling stock), the cost of operating the rail network (including signal operators), and day-
to-day track maintenance and inspections. The analysis excludes capital and depreciation 
costs, and therefore excludes the cost of track (and other infrastructure) repairs and 
renewals, and the capital cost of rolling stock (see below). For the rest of the paper, 
unless otherwise stated, cost is taken to mean operating costs (excluding depreciation). 
The paper uses the technique of social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) – as developed 
by Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990) – to evaluate the operating efficiency gains (or 
losses) resulting from privatisation, and also considers the allocation of these gains (or 
losses) between consumers, producers and government. The analysis assumes the growth 
in outputs achieved in recent years to be exogenous, and therefore focuses on the cost of 
delivering these outputs under the alternative scenarios of private and public ownership. 
The paper also looks at the changes in output quality (performance; overcrowding; asset 
condition; safety) since privatisation. Whilst capital is excluded from the social cost 
benefit analysis (due to the problem of establishing a counterfactual scenario), we 
provide separate evidence on railway capital investment before and after privatisation. 
The analysis uses data for the period to 1999/00 (financial year) only, and therefore 
does not take account of the effects of Hatfield. The next financial year (2000/01), which 
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includes the Hatfield accident, is not representative of the period since privatisation as a 
whole (and not all of the financial data are available in any case). Indeed, the effects of 
Hatfield continued into the financial year 2001/02. The analysis should be updated once 
data become fully available for three further years (2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03).  
It should be noted that the change in industry structure means that it is not 
straightforward to compare railway costs before and after privatisation. Our analysis 
makes a number of adjustments to the data to ensure comparability. Inevitably a number 
of assumptions have also been made. These adjustments and assumptions are explained 
in the relevant section of the paper (and also in the appendices).   
The SCBA methodology has previously been applied to a number of privatised 
industries in the UK, for example, electricity (Domah and Pollitt, 2001), and some of the 
earlier sell-offs (Galal et al, 1994; Martin and Parker, 1997). The paper is arranged into 
five sections. Section II briefly outlines the historical background. Section III summarises 
the theoretical arguments for liberalisation (restructuring and privatisation), and sets out 
the SCBA methodology and data used. Section IV shows the results of the analysis, and 
Section V offers some conclusions. 
 
II. Historical background 
 
The railway network in Britain was planned, financed and built by the private sector in 
the 19th Century. The industry was nationalised in 1948, and then returned to private 
ownership during the period 1995-1997, as part of the wider programme of sell-offs 
carried out by four successive Conservative administrations (1979-1997).  
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Since nationalisation, rail traffic has been in almost continual decline in the face of 
increased competition from road transport (see Figures 1A and 1B). In the early 1950s, 
passenger rail travel accounted for roughly 17% of total passenger traffic - by the mid-
1990s this share had fallen to around 5%. Rail freight business saw an even sharper loss 
of market share, from over 40% to just 7% over the same period, driven by the loss of 
traffic to roads, and the decline of Britain’s heavy manufacturing and primary industries 
(which rail freight was particularly well placed to serve). Rail volumes also fell in 
absolute terms up until the mid 1990s. As noted in the introduction, these trends have 
been reversed since privatisation5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1A
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5
 The upturn in the rail volumes began in 1995/96, one year before the industry had been fully privatised. 
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FIGURE 1B
Passenger Travel by Transport Mode (log)
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Sources: Transport Trends, 2001 Edition (DTLR). 
 
The railways moved into a loss-making position in the mid-1950s and, in spite of the 
line and station closures implemented following the Beeching reports (1963; 1965) - 
which saw the total route mileage reduced by a third - the industry’s financial position 
continued to deteriorate during the 1970s and early 1980s (as productivity growth slowed 
whilst wages were on the increase; and as government controls prevented the 
development of commercial pricing). The 1968 Transport Act explicitly recognised the 
need for government subsidy to support loss-making (but socially-beneficial) services. 
However, in line with worsening performance, the level of subsidy also increased over 
time, reaching £1.6bn by 1985/86, compared to £600m in 1968 (1999/00 prices). 
During the 1980s it was recognised that the financial position of the industry, and the 
requirement for government support, would complicate any attempt at privatising the  
industry. Rail privatisation would require route closures and/or continued government  
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subsidy after sale. As a result, proposals for rail privatisation developed slowly during the 
1980s, finally culminating in the sale of the industry during the period 1995-1997. 
However, the government (and BR), were not idle in the meantime, and began selling off 
many of BR’s non-core operations (see Table 1). Some of these sales raised substantial 
sums (for example, BR Hotels raised £150m in 1999/00 prices)6. 
 
TABLE 1 
BR Non-core Businesses Sold to the Private Sector (1981-1993)  
BR Hovercraft (1981) Doncaster Wagon Works (1987) 
BR Hotels (1982-1984) Horwich Foundry (1988) 
Superbreak Mini Holidays (1983) British Rail Engineering Ltd (1988) 
Slateford Laundry (1983) Travellers Fare [station catering] 
(1988) 
Sealink UK (1984) Transmark [consultancy] (1993) 
British Transport Advertising (1987) Meldon Quarry (1993) 
Sources: Bradshaw and Lawton-Smith (p 104) and Freeman & Shaw (page 9). 
 
The debate on privatising the core railway operations continued throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s. In 1992, immediately following the surprise Conservative election 
victory, a White Paper, ‘New Opportunities for the Railways’ (Department of Transport), 
was quickly put together under the direction of the John MacGregor (then Secretary of 
State for Transport). The strong likelihood that the Conservatives would lose the 
subsequent election (1997) injected an urgency into the process, as the government 
sought to complete the sale of the industry in one Parliament – and thus make 
privatisation effectively irreversible.  
                                                 
6
 Source: Public Enterprise Partnerships Team, HM Treasury. 
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The 1992 White Paper outlined the government’s privatisation objectives, which were 
similar to those for previous sell-offs: to harness the skills of private sector management, 
in order to achieve greater responsiveness to customer needs, higher service quality, 
improved efficiency and better value for money. The introduction of competition was 
thought to be the best way of achieving these objectives (following the example of the 
electricity restructuring in 1990), although it was recognised that regulation would be 
required to protect consumers (especially with regard to safety). 
As a result, the industry was separated (vertically and horizontally) into more than 
one hundred companies (see Figure 2 below), to allow competition to develop in the 
contestable elements of the business. The restructuring was carried out initially within the 
public sector, creating shadow companies, which were later sold. 
The most significant change was the separation of control of the track infrastructure 
(natural monopoly) from train operation (contestable). In 1994, most of the fixed railway 
infrastructure assets were transferred to a new company, Railtrack, separate from BR, but 
still wholly-owned by Government. The company was sold by public offer in 19967.  
At the same time, BR’s infrastructure services were reorganised into seven 
infrastructure maintenance and six track renewal companies (sold between February and 
July 1996). BR’s rolling stock was divided into three leasing companies (ROSCOs). The 
ROSCOs (sold in January/February 1996) lease locomotives and carriages to the 
passenger train operating companies8. Six heavy maintenance depots (provide services to 
ROSCOs) were also sold in April and June 19959.  
                                                 
7
 See Kain (1998) page 248; NAO Report (HC 25 Session 1998-99) page 20. 
8
 See NAO (HC 576 Session 1997-98) p 1. 
9
 See NAO (HC 25 Session 1998-99) page 22. 
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The right to run passenger train services was franchised to 25 private sector train 
operating companies (TOCs) - with open-access competition to be introduced gradually 
under the “moderation of competition” rules laid down by the Regulator (from 1995 
onwards). TOCs lease almost all of their rolling stock from the ROSCOs, and pay 
Railtrack for access to track and stations. Red Star Parcels was sold to a management 
buy-out in September 199510.  
 
FIGURE 2 
The New Rail Industry in 1996/97 
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10
 Provides rapid parcels distribution on passenger trains - see, Department of Transport, ‘New 
Opportunities for the Railways’ page 12; British Railway Board Accounts 1995/96. 
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Freight operations were separated into six companies (later consolidated into two) 
and sold between December 1995 and November 1997 (with open-access competition 
allowed from the outset). In addition, many other BR central services operations were 
sold to private sector companies or management teams11.  
As part of the reorganisation, two regulatory bodies were also created: (1) The Office 
of Rail Regulator (ORR), principally to regulate the monopoly element of the business - 
Railtrack; and (2) The Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), mainly 
responsible for awarding franchises, paying subsidies, and regulating the TOCs12. Rail 
Users’ Consultative Committees (RUCCs) were established to work with OPRAF in 
protecting the interests of rail users13. Safety regulation was placed with the Health & 
Safety Executive.  
Having described the background to rail privatisation, the remainder of the paper 
concentrates on whether the new structure has met one of the government’s main 
objectives – namely, improving operating efficiency - and how any efficiency gains (or 
losses) have been allocated between consumers, producers and government. 
Since privatisation industry outputs have increased substantially (reversing a long-
term trend of decline), whilst costs have fallen in real terms. The new structure gave the 
TOCs strong incentives to increase outputs and reduce costs (because of declining 
subsidies; fixed access charges). Whilst part of the output growth since the mid 1990s can 
be attributed to privatisation itself - through, for example, fare regulation and better 
marketing) - in the subsequent analysis (Section IV) we make the conservative 
                                                 
11
 See Kain (1998), page 250; Bradshaw and Lawton-Smith (2000), pages 108; 118; NAO Report ‘The Sale 
of Railfreight Distribution’. 
12
 John Swift (QC) and Roger Salmon were appointed as the first Rail Regulator and Franchising Director 
respectively (January 1993) - see Freeman & Shaw (2000), page 207. 
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assumption that output growth has been driven entirely by exogenous factors (eg. GDP 
growth; road congestion). This assumption reduces the benefits attributed to privatisation 
in our analysis.  
Our analysis therefore focuses on whether the industry’s outputs – driven by 
exogenous factors - would have been delivered more cheaply under the new structure 
than under continued public ownership. Data on output quality (performance; 
overcrowding; asset condition; safety) and capital costs are also evaluated. The new 
structure contained a number of features to ensure that efficiency gains would be shared 
with consumers (fare regulation; competition) and government (declining subsidy 
profile). The analysis in Section IV quantifies the allocation of efficiency gains (or 
losses) between the different groups.  
 
III. Methodology 
 
1. Theoretical issues and empirical work 
 
The ideological belief underlying the privatisation of British Rail was that the injection of 
private sector expertise and flair would result in improved services, more efficient 
operations, and better value for money for the travelling public. It was also hoped that the 
private sector would be able to lure passengers and freight customers back to the railways 
(greater responsiveness to customer needs), and arrest the long-term decline of the 
industry. 
                                                                                                                                                 
13
 See Freeman & Shaw (2000), p 33. 
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However, following earlier privatisations (eg. BT and British Gas), it was recognised 
that change in ownership alone would be insufficient to deliver the required 
improvements in services and cost. Whilst private ownership and the profit motive 
provide better incentives than public ownership, the government saw competition, and 
the ending of BR’s monopoly, as key to delivering improvements on the railways.  
The liberalisation of public enterprises in general often involves three separate, and 
not necessarily connected elements: changes in ownership; the creation of new, or 
radically restructured companies; and the introduction of some degree of competition. 
Depending on the combination of these factors, liberalisation will tend to cause 
significant changes in the way businesses are conducted. Pollitt (1997) identifies five 
theoretical arguments relating to the likely efficiency effects of liberalisation: 
1. liberalisation can improve incentives by reallocating property rights from the public 
to the private sector; 
2. liberalisation may change the objective functions of managers being faced with 
private sector incentives for the first time; 
3. there may be incentives for distortionary resource allocation, caused by some types of 
regulation (eg. rate of return regulation) leading to inefficiency; 
4. liberalisation may cause “influence activities” within the industry (eg. empire 
building), which may result in a divergence from efficiency; and 
5. policy commitment theories suggest that liberalisation will result in lower 
intervention costs. 
Pollitt (1997) notes that, in a developed, market economy such as the UK, the 
theoretical predictions provide some (weak) support for restructuring and privatisation in 
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the case of property rights, bureaucracy and commitment theories; but that poorly 
constructed incentive regulation could negate all the other positive benefits from 
liberalisation. As a result, the impact of any particular restructuring and privatisation 
process (in a given industry or country) has the potential to be highly variable. 
A number of methodologies have been used to assess the impact of liberalisation, for 
example based on price or cost comparisons, as used by Yarrow (1992) and Bishop and 
Thompson (1992), or using simulation or frontier approaches, such as Burns and 
Weyman-Jones (1994). These methodologies have been criticised as they do not directly 
address the issue of whether it is likely to be socially beneficial (in particular they do not 
address the distributional effects of liberalisation).  
A more comprehensive approach would be the computational general equilibrium 
(CGE) method (for example, Chisari, Estache and Romero,1999), which assess the 
macroeconomic and distributional effects of privatisation and regulation. However, none 
of these approaches possess the power of an overall social cost-benefit analysis (outlined 
below), and are themselves based on numerous assumptions regarding specification of 
objectives and constraints. 
SCBA studies, for example Galal et al (1994) and others (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997) 
have addressed the failures of the other methodologies. In this paper we use a SCBA 
framework to analyse the effect of liberalising Britain’s railway industry. 
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2. The Social Cost-Benefit Methodology 
 
The methodology developed by Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang is concerned first with 
assessing the total change in welfare resulting from privatisation and restructuring, and 
second with the allocation of this change, principally between three groups, consumers, 
producers (ie shareholders of the new, privatised companies), and government14. The first 
question relates to the productive efficiency impact (net of restructuring costs) of 
liberalisation, whilst the latter is concerned with equity. For simplicity our analysis 
ignores changes in allocative efficiency. 
Jones et al define the privatisation decision according to the following formula: 

'W = Vsp - Vsg + (Og-Op)*Z 
 
where: W = Social Welfare; Vsp  = Social value of firm under private operation;  
Vsg = Social value of firm under continued government operation; Z = Price paid to buy 
the firm (or government sales proceeds) and Og and Op are the shadow multipliers on 
government revenue and private funds respectively. 
Privatisation will be socially worthwhile if 'W>0. In a developed, market economy, 
we would expect no significant difference in the value of shadow multipliers, so for the 
purpose of our analysis we set Og=Op=1. The sales proceeds variable, Z, which is a 
                                                 
14
 Jones et al also consider other parties, such as competitors and suppliers (often excluded from empirical 
applications of the methodology on practical grounds), and workers (often excluded on the grounds that 
any rents earned by employees are fully compensated through redundancy payments, which are included 
within the cost base of the companies concerned). 
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transfer payment between government and producers, therefore drops out of the equation 
(though remains important for its distributional effects). 
The calculation of 'W involves computing the difference between the costs under 
public and private ownership (both over the period since privatisation, and into the 
future). Costs under private ownership (to date) are based on actual data; and these also 
need to be projected into the future. However, the main difficulty lies in estimating what 
would have happened to costs under continued public ownership. In order to address this 
issue we need to build a counterfactual scenario based on historic and other economic 
data. 
The efficiency savings due to liberalisation are calculated as the difference between 
the present value of actual (private) and counterfactual (continued public ownership) 
costs. Restructuring costs are then deducted, to arrive at the value of 'W. The final step 
is to allocate 'W between the three groups (consumers, producers, and government), and 
therefore to determine the winners and losers (see below).  
 
(a) Comparing Costs with and without Privatisation 
 
The first task is to decide on the cut-off point between public and private ownership. In 
this paper we take 1996/97 as the first full year of privatisation15. However, the last year 
of public ownership is taken to be 1992/93, since this is the last year unaffected by the 
                                                 
15
 By 1996/97 the following parts of the industry had been sold: Railtrack (sold in May 1996); the three 
ROSCOs (sold in January/February 1996); thirteen infrastructure companies (sold between February and 
July 1996); six heavy maintenance depots (sold in April and June 1995); Red Star Parcels (sold in 
September 1995); the majority of the freight businesses (sold between December 1995 and May 1996, with 
the exception of Railfreight Distribution, which was not sold until November 1997). By the end of 1996/97, 
all of the 25 franchises had been let.  
 15
restructuring and privatisation programme16 (see below). The transition period (1993/94 
to 1995/96) saw the restructuring of the industry and its transfer to private ownership.  
The sale of British Rail was accompanied by a radical restructuring of the industry, to 
create more than one hundred new companies. As a result, computing the total (actual) 
rail industry cost since privatisation is not straightforward, given the number of 
companies involved, and the complex set of financial payments flowing between the 
companies. In addition, care is required in comparing cost data before and after 
privatisation. 
It was not possible to calculate the post-privatisation cost base by adding up the costs 
of the constituent parts (and eliminating inter-company flows), as the data did not permit 
such an analysis. We get around this problem by deriving industry costs as the difference 
between total industry revenue received from final users (train operator revenue), less 
total industry operating profits (non-operating revenues, costs and profits are excluded 
from the analysis). The data are shown in Table 2, for the post-privatisation period 
(1996/97 to 1999/00). The data for earlier years are taken directly from BR Annual 
Reports.  
The costs in Table 2 are operating costs (excluding depreciation). Whilst a full SCBA 
analysis would also include a consideration of capital costs, this paper focuses only on 
the operating side of the business. As stated in the introduction, capital is excluded from 
our analysis due to the difficulty of establishing a counterfactual. We note that it is 
common in railway efficiency studies to focus on operating costs, due to problems of 
capital measurement and comparability. However, this comes at a price, since operating 
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efficiency improvements may be mistaken for capital substitution effects; and capital 
expenditure also impacts on output quality. We present evidence to address both of these 
issues in Section IV.4. 
A number of points are worth noting with regard to the data in Table 2. First, it 
excludes the costs of minor (open-access) freight operators (though these are small), thus 
underestimating post-privatisation costs slightly. On the other hand, the profit data in 
Table 2 do not reflect the returns made by the many supplier companies sold as part of 
the restructuring, who now provide services to the industry (therefore overstating the 
post-privatisation costs). ORR costs are charged out to the industry, so do not need to be 
added separately.  
The costs of the Strategic Rail Authority are included in Table 2 (netted off against 
TOC profits) – though to the extent that the SRA, and its predecessor, OPRAF, were 
staffed through transfers from other parts of government, the inclusion of these costs may 
overstate costs under the privatisation scenario, relative to the counterfactual. Indeed, 
Department of Transport costs, which would have been considerably higher under the 
counterfactual, are not included in our analysis.  
Residual BR costs have been excluded (these include policing costs, which are 
charged out to the industry)17. On balance, given the scale of some of the supplier 
contracts - for example, Railtrack spends roughly £1.3bn per year on contracts with 
infrastructure maintenance and renewal companies alone - we expect that the approach 
used overstates the post-privatisation costs overall, and therefore underestimates the 
                                                                                                                                                 
16
 In 1993/94 a voluntary severance offer was announced, in preparation for changes in organisation and 
ownership, which led to over 7000 employees leaving the industry. 
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efficiency gains from privatisation. In their report for the ORR, Europe Economics 
(2000) note that anecdotal evidence points to substantial margins achieved by rail 
contractors. For further explanation of the costs in Table 2 see Appendix A.  
For the counterfactual cost scenario, we have relied on historical data from BR’s 
accounts. We started by reviewing the cost data for ten years prior to privatisation 
(1984/85 to 1993/94) – note that privatisation began in 1994/95 (eg. heavy maintenance 
depots were sold, and Railtrack was created as a separate company, within government). 
However, the final period chosen to inform the counterfactual was shortened to the five 
years (1988/89 to 1992/93) for the reasons outlined below. The use of five years pre-
privatisation data is common in divestiture studies (see Galal et al, 1994). 
The financial year 1993/94 was excluded from the pre-privatisation period – this year 
was significantly affected by the privatisation and restructuring programme, and saw a 
voluntary severance programme, in preparation for privatisation, which led to a 7% 
reduction in headcount in that year18. We note that it is common in privatisation studies 
to exclude the years immediately prior to privatisation (either to capture the effects of 
privatisation announcements on productivity growth; or because data for those years may 
be distorted by privatisation provisions)19. 
                                                                                                                                                 
17
 BR residual costs also include some property costs (non-operational) and costs relating to liabilities 
relating to the pre-privatisation period. Further analysis may look at whether any of these costs should be 
added to the post-privatisation cost base. 
18
 In the Annual Report for 1993/94, this programme was specifically linked with privatisation. 1993/94 
also saw a number of minor sell-offs (Transmark and Meldon Quarry). 
19
 See Galal et al (1994); Martin and Parker (1997); Newbery and Pollitt (1997). 
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TABLE 2 
Rail Industry Costs (Computed as Revenue less Profit) 
 
Rail Industry Costs Pre-privatisation Transitiong Post-privatisation 
£m, 99/00 pricesa 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00
 
Passenger revenueb
Freight revenuec
Railtrack prop. incomed
Total industry revenue (A) 
 
TOC profits  
Freight profits 
ROSCO profits 
Railtrack profits 
Total profits (B)e
 
Industry costs (A-B) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,287 4,195
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,176 4,394 4,406
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NA NA
 
5,220 
607 
133 
5,960
 
24 
52 
1,035 
533 
1,644
 
4,316
5,223
573
134
5,930
181
87
1,064
528
1,860
4,070
 
5,180 
555 
139 
5,874
 
162 
82 
1,054 
483 
1,781
 
4,093
5,150
601
137
5,888
164
68
1,028
473
1,733
4,155
Passenger train miles (m) 
Freight-tonne miles (bn) 
Composite indexf
222 
11.2 
100
225
10.4
99
232 
9.9 
100
231
9.5
99
228
9.6
98
228 
8.6 
96 
222 
8.1 
92
231
8.3
96
229 
9.4 
98
237
10.5
103
249 
10.8 
108
257
11.4
112
(a) Conversion uses RPI data. (b) Includes subsidies. TOCs only (excludes Heathrow Express and Eurostar). Financial data for 5 TOCs were not available for 
1999/00 – data were extrapolated for these TOCs. (c) Includes EWS and Freightliner20. (d) That part of Railtrack’s income which does not come from TOCs or 
freight operators (needs to be included for comparability with BR data). (e) Operating profits before depreciation, net of SRA/OPRAF costs; excludes non-
operating profits, such as profits on asset sales. (f) Weighted index used to calculate unit costs (88/90 =100). Weighted based on freight/passenger revenue. (g) It 
was not possible to construct comparable data for 94/95 and 95/96 due to restructuring.  
 
Sources: BR Annual Reports; Annual Reports for individual companies (post privatisation). Transport Trends, 2001 Edition (DTLR). 
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 Data for Freightliner has been collected for 1998/99 and 1999/00 only – the data for 1996/97 and 1997/98 was extrapolated.  
 
 The data from 1984/85 to 1987/88 have also been excluded from the analysis. 
1984/85 and 1985/86 was affected by the coal strike (see BR Annual Report, 1985/86). 
The data between 1986/87 and 1988/89 were impacted by the sale of a number of 
businesses, continuing a trend which started in the early 1980s (see Table 1). In 
particular, BR sold British Rail Engineering Ltd (BREL) and Travellers Fare (station 
catering). Whilst it is not possible to calculate the exact impact of these sales on BR’s 
cost base, the sales of the two businesses led to a reduction in headcount by around 
13,000 (or 8%) between 1987/88 and 1988/89.  
Having established the appropriate time period for historical analysis, the 
counterfactual cost profile is then constructed based on the 1992/93 cost level, projected 
forward using an assumption about counterfactual efficiency gains (based on historical 
performance). The construction of the counterfactual cost scenario is described in detail 
in Section IV.1.  
The calculation of a counterfactual cost profile, based on historic data, raises the 
question of whether the pre and post-privatisation cost data are comparable. The 
formation of Railtrack in 1994/95 saw a change in accounting policy through the 
introduction of the Asset Maintenance Plan Charge (AMP). This approach forecasts the 
required repairs and renewal activity for track, route structures, stations and depots over a 
ten year period, and charges one tenth of this estimate to the P&L in each year (as 
depreciation21).  
However, we are satisfied that the data (pre and post privatisation) remain 
comparable, despite the change in policy. The main impact of the change was to 
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significantly increase depreciation costs (to address under-investment before 
privatisation, and to bring accounting policies into line with other regulated industries – 
see Appendix B). As noted already, depreciation costs are excluded from operating costs 
in our analysis. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the change resulted in 
any transfer of cost between operating costs and capex: the level of day-to-day 
infrastructure maintenance (the operating element of maintenance costs) increased in 
1994/95, compared with the previous year22.  
To complete the analysis, the SCBA approach requires projections of both the actual 
(privatised) and counterfactual (public ownership) costs into the future. For simplicity, 
we have assumed that no further savings are made after 1999/00, and that the efficiency 
gap opened up by the private sector is closed over the following fifteen years (that is, the 
public sector is assumed to catch up over time).  
 
(b) The Efficiency Gains from Restructuring and Privatisation 
 
The value of efficiency gains from privatisation and restructuring are simply calculated as  
the difference between the present value of the two cost profiles Cg-Cp less the present 
value of restructuring and privatisation costs (R&P). 
 
'W= Cg-Cp – R&P 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
21
 From 1998/99 onwards the AMP charge formally became part of depreciation under FRS 15. 
22
 See BR and Railtrack Annual Reports for the relevant years. 
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The consumer surplus impact of higher traffic volumes is excluded from our calculation 
of 'W, since volume growth is assumed to be exogenous. This is a simplifying 
assumption, made necessary by the difficulty of establishing how much of the traffic 
growth is due to privatisation versus other factors (such as the economic upturn). This 
assumption also reduces the benefits attributed to privatisation in our analysis. 
Restructuring and privatisation costs are assumed to be zero under the counterfactual 
scenario. Under the privatisation scenario they include all R&P costs incurred within 
government (in 1993/94, 1994/95 and 1995/96), and all restructuring costs incurred since 
privatisation (1996/97 onwards, by the newly-privatised companies).  
 
(c) Distribution of the Net Efficiency Gains 
   
Once the present value of the net efficiency gains from privatisation has been calculated, 
the next step is to analyse its distribution between consumers, producers and government, 
as summarised in the following identity: 

'W= 'Cust + 'Prod + 'Gov 

'Cust is calculated as the difference between actual and counterfactual average 
revenue (price), multiplied by the actual volume. The price was computed using a 
composite volume index based on passenger miles and freight tonne-miles (weighted 
according to passenger and freight revenue). The counterfactual average revenue (price) 
projection was estimated by extrapolating the trend in average revenue for the five years 
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prior to privatisation (for simplicity we are ignoring the allocative efficiency aspect of 
any price changes).  
The change in the government’s position ('Gov) is relatively complex, and includes a 
number of factors. First of all, by selling the industry the government foregoes any 
potential profit/(deficit) streams from the business in future, and in return receives the 
sales proceeds for the industry and a share of future profitability through corporation tax. 
In contrast to earlier privatisations, the government has also continued to provide ongoing 
revenue subsidies23 to the sector since privatisation. The counterfactual scenario assumes 
that the government would continue to pay revenue subsidies to cover operating losses. 
However, there is a further complication here. On privatisation, the government was 
relieved (to some extent24) of its responsibility to provide funding for capital investment 
(which averaged £1.1bn per annum in 1999/00 prices during the five years prior to 
privatisation). Whilst the social cost benefit analysis in this paper focuses on operating 
costs (and ignores capital costs), it is necessary to reflect the saved capital costs in the 
calculation of the government’s welfare position. The average of £1.1bn per annum is 
used in the counterfactual to reflect this, and the same figure is used (with a negative 
sign) to reflect the capital costs which the private sector would need to cover out of 
operating profits25.  
                                                 
23
 In the analysis in Section IV, subsidies are taken to include both Central Government subsidies (paid 
through OPRAF), and PTE grants. 
24
 Note that the Periodic Review (2000) allowed for significant grant payments direct to Railtrack (from 
2001/02), to cover the exceptional level of renewal expenditure required over the next control period. 
However, grants to Railtrack in the years since privatisation (1996/97 to 1999/00) have been relatively 
small, and are not reflected in the allocation of efficiency gains between government and producers 
(however, grant income is taken account of in arriving at operating costs – see Appendix A). 
25
 Thus implicitly assuming that privatisation has no impact on the efficiency or level of capital investment. 
The evidence on capital is addressed separately in Section IV.4 below. 
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'Gov is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
'Gov  = Privatisation Scenario (Taxes – Subsidy + Sales Proceeds)  
 
– Counterfactual Scenario (Operating profits/losses + Capital Subsidies) 
 
For producers, there is no counterfactual (since the counterfactual assumes public 
ownership). 'Prod is simply calculated as the post-tax profits under the privatisation 
scenario, less the amount paid to purchase the business (the corollary of government sales 
proceeds), less an amount to reflect capital expenditure (the corollary of the £1.1bn saved 
capital cost used to calculate 'Gov).  
With regard to future projections – that is, beyond 1999/00 - it is assumed that the 
privatisation scenario variables remain at their 1999/00 levels26, whilst the counterfactual 
cost and fares gradually fall until they are in line with the privatisation scenario. To 
complete the above calculations, restructuring costs are subtracted from 'Gov and 'Prod, 
depending on when the costs were incurred (ie before or after privatisation).  
 
                                                 
26
 This means that the actual government subsidy and the saved capital cost is assumed to remain at its 
1999/00 level. Of course, existing franchise agreements build in further subsidy reductions, though it is not 
clear that these are sustainable. In addition, the debate over the levels of capital expenditure required, and 
particularly who will fund it, is ongoing. 
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IV. Results 
 
1. Cost changes 
 
Figure 3 shows the profile of total rail industry costs (actual) over the period 1988/89 to 
1999/00. The data show that total costs were rising in the period up until 1992/93, fell 
sharply in 1993/94, as the restructuring of the industry began, and then remained broadly 
static in real terms between 1993/94 and 1999/00, whilst industry outputs grew strongly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* After privatisation, costs are calculated as total revenue less profits, as shown in Table 2. 
 
In order to understand what has been happening to unit costs over the period, we first 
need to decide on an appropriate measure of output. The next step is to separate out the 
impact of scale/density effects from underlying efficiency improvements. This second 
FIGURE 3
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step requires an assumption about the proportions of fixed and variable costs in the rail 
industry. 
Our measure of output (see Table 2 above), is a composite index based on passenger 
train miles and freight tonne-miles, weighted according to the split between passenger 
and freight revenues. With respect to fixed and variable costs we make the following 
assumptions: 
1. based on work carried out during the 2000 Periodic Review of Railtrack’s access 
charges, we assume that 17%27 of infrastructure costs are variable with respect to 
volume (or 83% of costs are fixed). In our analysis, infrastructure costs make up 36% 
of the total cost base; 
2. for the remainder of the cost base we assume that costs exhibit broadly constant 
returns to scale (we assume that 10% of these remaining costs are fixed). 
Overall, our assumptions on scale mean that around 37% of the cost base is fixed with 
respect to volume28. Of course there will be other fixed costs, including infrastructure 
renewal and rolling stock depreciation costs, but these are excluded, as our analysis 
focuses on operating expenditure, and excludes capital (or depreciation) costs. The 
variable cost element is assumed to vary in line with our volume index, which is based on 
passenger train miles and freight tonne-miles.  
It is important to note that passenger miles are not included in our measure of volume. 
This is a conservative assumption which reduces the level of efficiency gains attributed to 
                                                 
27
 The Periodic Review analysis found that 17% of maintenance and renewal cost was usage-driven. Since 
our analysis includes only maintenance costs, we have assumed that 17% of maintenance costs are variable. 
In addition, traction costs are also assumed to be variable, which (coincidentally) produces a figure of 17% 
variable costs overall. 
28
 This assumption is in line with other studies of the rail industry. See, for example, Estache and de Rus 
(2000), page 208. 
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privatisation in our calculations. Passenger miles have grown much faster than passenger 
train miles in recent years (21%, compared to only 13% since 1992/93). We note, 
however, that whilst train miles are likely to be the main driver of costs, some costs will 
increase in line with passenger miles (for example, an increased number of coaches have 
been employed since privatisation to accommodate higher passenger numbers; station 
and revenue-protection costs are also likely to vary with passenger miles).  
Now that we have made our choice of volume measure and assumption about returns 
to scale, we are in a position to analyse the trends in unit costs (before and after 
privatisation), and to separate out the scale effects from underlying efficiency gains. 
Table 3 presents total and unit costs for the pre and post privatisation periods, splitting 
out the impact of scale effects from efficiency improvements. 
The first section of Table 3 shows that scale effects would have caused unit costs to 
rise by 0.2% per annum over the five years 1988/89 to 1992/93 (falling volumes, with 
37% of cost base fixed). Actual unit costs rose by 1.2% per annum, implying negative 
efficiencies, or an efficiency loss of 1% per annum over the period29. However, we are 
reluctant to assume a 1% efficiency deterioration as our counterfactual. In our 
central counterfactual scenario we therefore assume that BR would have delivered 
efficiency gains of 1% per annum over the period 1992/93 to 1999/00. This assumption 
weighs heavily in favour of public ownership. However, it gains some empirical support 
                                                 
29
 We note that BR made a significant change to its accounting policy in 1991/92, which meant that 
infrastructure costs were capitalised for the first time. Since BR produced data for 1991/92 on both 
accounting bases, we have been able to construct a consistent time series for the period 1988/89 to 1992/93. 
However, the lumpy nature of infrastructure spending may cause problems of comparability of individual 
years during the period before 1991/92 (though note that major upgrade expenditure was capitalised across 
the whole period). 
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from a study by Bishop and Thompson (1992), which found that British Rail delivered 
labour productivity growth of 0.6% per annum over the period 1970-199030.  
 
TABLE 3 
Unit Cost Analysis 
 
Pre-privatisation period  
 
88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93  Annual 
Change  
 
Scale effects – no efficiencies 
Unit costsa – after scale effects 
 
Unit costs  
Actual 
 
Underlying efficiency gain/(loss) 
Actual 
 
 
42.9
42.9
 
43.0
42.4
 
 
42.9
41.8
 
 
 
43.0 
 
 
44.4 
 
43.2
44.9
 
0.2%
1.2%
(1.0%)
 
 
   
Post-privatisation period  
 
92/93 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00  Annual 
Change  
 
Scale effects – no efficiencies 
Unit costsa – after scale effects  
 
Unit costs 
Actual 
Counterfactual 
 
Underlying efficiency gain 
Actual 
Counterfactual 
 
44.9
44.9
44.9
44.9
44.1
43.2
44.1
39.4
41.9
 
 
 
43.4 
 
 
37.9 
40.9 
 
 
 
 
42.9
37.1
39.9
(0.7%)
(2.7%) 
(1.7%) 
2.0%
1.0%
(a) Unit costs calculated by dividing total costs by our volume index.  
 
                                                 
30
 This study shows two distinct periods. In the 1970s, labour productivity declined by 2% per year, and 
then grew by 3.2% per annum in the 1980s. However, the 1980s data is heavily distorted by the partial 
privatisation process which took place during that period, referred to above. Furthermore, the study uses a 
volume index which includes passenger miles, rather than train miles.  
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The second section of Table 3 shows actual and counterfactual unit costs (central 
scenario) for the post-privatisation period. This shows that actual unit costs fell by 2.7% 
per annum over the period, of which 0.7% is due to scale effects, and 2.0% to underlying 
efficiency improvements. Under the counterfactual scenario, unit costs fall by 1.7% per 
annum, of which 1% per annum results from the assumed underlying efficiency savings, 
and the balance from scale effects (0.7%). 
Figure 4 below shows actual costs, and the profile of counterfactual costs under three 
scenarios: pro-privatisation scenario (underlying efficiency gain of 0% per annum); 
central scenario (underlying efficiency gain of 1% p.a., described above); and pro-public 
scenario (underlying efficiency gain of 2% p.a.). As noted in Section III.2, it is assumed 
that the efficiency gap opened up by the private sector is gradually closed over the next 
15 years (post 1999/00) – that is, the public sector is assumed to catch up. This 
assumption therefore weighs in support of continued public ownership, and against 
privatisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* After privatisation, actual costs are calculated as total revenue less profits, as shown in Table 2. 
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2. Calculation of efficiency gains 
 
Table 4 provides estimates of the discounted efficiency gains (pre-restructuring) resulting 
from rail privatisation in the UK. Estimates are shown for the three alternative 
assumptions about underlying efficiency improvements under the counterfactual scenario 
(0%, 1% and 2%). In addition, the results are also shown for two different discount rates, 
6% (used by government) and 10% (private sector discount rate). 
With a 6% discount rate, the central scenario shows the total discounted efficiency 
gains to be £2.5bn. This efficiency gain is partly offset by restructuring costs of £1.4bn 
(see Table 5), yielding efficiency gains net of restructuring costs of £1.1bn. 
 
TABLE 4 
Gross Efficiency Savings (Pre-Restructuring) 
 
Counterfactual  
unit cost reduction 
Discount rate 
 6% 10% 
0% £5,200m £4,800m 
   
1% £2,500m £2,200m 
   
2% (£100m) (£200m) 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Restructuring Costs 
 
Restructuring costs  
(present value) 
93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00
Government 427 415 239  
Private sector 176 63 33 98
Total 427 415 239 176 63 33 98
Sources: British Rail Annual Reports; Annual Reports for privatised companies 
(Railtrack; 25 TOCs; 3 ROSCOs; EWS). 
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Table 6 (below) shows the profiling of the discounted savings between the period to 
date (1996/97 to 1999/00) and the future (the savings gap achieved to date is assumed to 
be closed over the next 15 years). The units of the data in Table 6 are £million 
(discounted). 
Under the Central Scenario (6% discount rate), the data show that privatisation has 
already yielded £800m in efficiency savings, although these savings have been more than 
offset by restructuring costs (£1,400m). This position is unsurprising, as the industry has 
only been in private hands for four years, and we would expect the cost of restructuring to 
be recovered over a longer period. Total savings (including future savings31) under the 
Central Scenario amount to £1,100m (£500m at a 10% discount rate) after restructuring 
costs. 
TABLE 6 
Profiling of Efficiency Savings 
 
 
Discount rate 
 6% 10% 
 To 
date 
Fut. Total To date Fut. Total 
Pro-privatisation 
scenario 
      
Efficiency gains 1,900 3,300 5,200 2,000 2,800 4,800 
Restructuring costs (1,400) - (1,400) (1,700) - (1,700) 
Net efficiency gain/(loss) 500 - 3,800 300 - 3,100 
Central scenario       
Efficiency gains 800 1,700 2,500 800 1,400 2,200 
Restructuring costs (1,400) - (1,400) (1700) - (1700) 
Net efficiency gain/(loss) (600) - 1,100 (900) - 500 
Pro-public scenario       
Efficiency gains (200) 100 (100) (200) 0 (200) 
Restructuring costs (1,400) - (1,400) (1,700) - (1,700) 
Net efficiency gain/(loss) (1,600) - (1,500) (1,900) - (1,900) 
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The data in Table 6 are sensitive to the cost assumption under the counterfactual 
scenario. The savings estimates are much higher if we assume that underlying unit costs 
would have remained flat under public ownership (pro-privatisation scenario); on the 
other hand, under a counterfactual cost assumption of 2% (pro-public scenario), the 
savings become approximately zero (before restructuring costs)32. However, given the 
fact that unit costs increased during the pre-privatisation period (by more than would 
have been expected due to scale effects alone – see Table 3), it is difficult to argue for a 
counterfactual cost reduction that is more aggressive than assumed in the central scenario.  
It is important to note that this paper does not seek to explain the improvements in 
efficiency. Freeman & Shaw (2000)33 provide some anecdotal evidence on efficiency 
improvements achieved by the TOCs (through staff reductions). In addition, during the 
2000 Periodic Review Railtrack reported significant efficiency savings since privatisation 
(2.2% per annum between 1994/95 and 1999/00)34. Over the period since 1995/96, we 
note that total TOC and Railtrack staff numbers declined from 58,400 to 50,30035, a 
reduction of 14% (though it has been argued that TOCs reduced staff too quickly in the 
early years after privatisation, resulting in driver shortages)36. The reduction in 
TOC/Railtrack headcount provides some support for the efficiency improvements 
reported in this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                 
31
 Note that, as described earlier, the future savings do not reflect additional savings – rather they are based 
on the continuation of the savings gap in 1999/00 into future years (though declining each year as the 
public sector is assumed to catch up). 
32
 Note that it is assumed that the public sector (counterfactual) cost profile catches up with the privatisation 
scenario over time, but that no restructuring costs are required to achieve this catch up. In practice, 
restructuring costs would also be required under public ownership. 
33
 Freeman and Shaw (2000), Chapter 7. 
34
 See Office of the Rail Regulator (December 1999). 
35
 TOC staff numbers taken from Affuso, Angeriz and Pollitt (2002); Railtrack data from Railtrack Annual 
Reports.  
36
 See Freeman and Shaw (2000), Chapter 7. 
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Furthermore, a recent survey of rail transport efficiency carried out by Oum, Waters 
II and Yu (1999) found that increased competition (driven by liberalisation and 
deregulation) led to improved efficiency in almost all of the papers reviewed37. This 
finding was confirmed during the 2000 Periodic Review of Railtrack’s access charges, 
where international and UK evidence all pointed to the strong efficiency savings expected 
from change of ownership (and deregulation). These arguments were used to inform the 
Regulator’s decision on future efficiency targets for Railtrack over the second control 
period (2001 to 2006). 
 
3. Allocation of efficiency savings 
 
Table 7 shows the allocation of the efficiency gains/(losses) between producers, 
government and consumers. 'Gov/('Prod) include the privatisation proceeds 
/(payments). The subsidy data used in the analysis include both OPRAF subsidies and 
PTE grants. The units of the data in Table 7 are £million (discounted). 
The key result from the above table is that the consumer benefits from privatisation 
to the tune of £1.2bn. Average revenue (passenger and freight revenue divided by a 
composite volume index based on passenger miles and freight tonne-miles) was lower in 
real terms in every year since privatisation than before the sell-off (see Figure 5 below). 
This gain has been secured, in part, by the arrangements put in place to constrain price 
increases on regulated fares below the rate of inflation. Before privatisation, prices were 
                                                 
37
 We note that in the case of Britain’s railways, competition between passenger train operators has been 
limited mainly to overlapping franchises and duplicate routes. However, the franchise process resulted in 
significant competition for franchises (competition for the market). In addition, some competition has 
developed in the freight business. Other elements of the value chain have also been subject to competition 
(at least in theory), for example, infrastructure maintenance companies, and ROSCOs. 
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often increased in real terms to choke off demand (the counterfactual assumes that this 
policy would have been continued). 
TABLE 7 
Allocation of Efficiency Savings 
 
 Discount rate 
 6% 10% 
 Pro-privatisation scenario (cost fall of 0% pa) 
'Gov  2,400 3,900 
'Prod 38 200 (2,000) 
'Cust  1,200 1,200 
'W 3,800 3,100 
 Central scenario (cost fall of 1% pa) 
'Gov  (300) 1,300 
'Prod 200 (2,000) 
'Cust  1,200 1,200 
'W 1,100 500 
 Pro-public scenario (cost fall of 2% pa) 
'Gov  (2,900) (1,100) 
'Prod 200 (2,000) 
'Cust  1,200 1,200 
'W (1,500) (1,900) 
 
Overall, under the Central Scenario, consumers gain slightly more than the level of 
savings, leaving producers and government together with a loss of £100m. The split 
between government and producers takes accounts of the privatisation sales proceeds 
(£7bn in present value terms – see Table 8 below). However, the split between the two 
groups is also highly sensitive to the assumption made about the government’s savings 
through reduced capital investment (and correspondingly the level of private capital 
investment), which is not the focus of this paper. 
                                                 
38
 Note that changes in the counterfactual cost assumption only affect the payout to government: a better 
counterfactual cost performance means that the government would have had to provide lower support to the 
industry under public ownership, which means that its gains are lower the higher the counterfactual cost 
reduction. Consumer benefits (based on prices) and producer gains (based on actual, not counterfactual 
performance) are unaffected by changes in the counterfactual cost assumption 
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* Weighted index based on passenger miles and freight tonne-miles. 
 
TABLE 8 
Rail Privatisation Proceeds 
 
Rail Privatisation proceeds  £bn (current prices) £bn (present value)
Railtrack * 
ROSCOs 
Freight 
Infrastructure & Maintenance  cos. 
BR Central Services 
Total 
2.5
1.7
0.3
0.3
0.2
5.0
3.5
2.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
7.0
* Includes £596m of debt.  
Sources: NAO Reports (HC 576, Session 1997/98; HC 25 Session 1998/99); Public 
Enterprise Partnerships Team, HM Treasury. 
 
 
4. Capital costs 
 
We have already noted that capital costs have been excluded from the social cost benefit 
analysis presented in this paper. Constructing a counterfactual scenario for capital 
FIGURE 5
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investment is especially difficult, since it is affected by so many different factors (for 
example, the timing of large enhancement projects; traffic levels; the lumpy nature of 
renewal programmes; cash constraints imposed by Treasury before privatisation; and 
investment delays resulting from the privatisation process itself). Problems with capital 
measurement and comparability mean that railway efficiency studies often focus solely 
on operating costs. 
However, railway investment is important in the present context for three reasons. 
First of all, the overall level of capital investment will impact on output quality (safety, 
asset condition and performance). Secondly, the obvious question arises concerning the 
relative efficiency of capital investment under public and private ownership. Finally, it is 
possible that capital substitution effects may have contributed to the operating efficiency 
savings reported in the previous sub-section. Whilst there is insufficient information to 
consider these effects within the formal SCBA methodology, in the discussion below we 
seek to draw some indicative conclusions from the available data. 
  
(a) Capital investment levels before and after privatisation 
 
The privatised rail industry has been heavily criticised for its record on safety and 
performance. Much of this criticism has been directed at Railtrack, which, it is argued, 
has failed to invest sufficiently to maintain the condition of the network. However, the 
key question for this paper is whether the position would have been better or worse under 
public ownership. Of course, this assessment is subject to considerable uncertainty, as 
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already noted. However, the data suggests that it is highly unlikely that investment levels 
would have been higher under public ownership (see table 9 below). 
Table 9 shows the total investment in Britain’s rail industry over the period 1988/89 
to 1999/00, as well as the breakdown between rolling stock and other (which largely 
relates to infrastructure renewal and enhancement)39. This data includes investment made 
by BR in preparation for the running of services through the Channel Tunnel40. Table 9 
shows that total investment (real terms) has been considerably higher in the post-
privatisation period, especially from 1998/99. In 1999/00, total investment was more than 
double the level of twelve years earlier (1988/89). 
  
TABLE 9 
Investment in Britain’s Rail Industry 
£m (99/00 prices) Rolling Stock Other Total
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
1995/96 
1996/97 
1997/98 
1998/99 
1999/00 
 
316 
331 
432 
561 
644 
493 
414 
224 
51 
120 
180 
236
739
927
910
1039
1125
890
1025
1007
1277
1508
1867
2012
1055 
1258 
1342 
1600 
1769 
1383 
1439 
1231 
1328 
1628 
2047 
2248
Source: SRA 
 
                                                 
39
 Although there are some definitional changes (from 1994/95 and post 1995/96), these do not appear to 
have a significant impact on the data. 
40
 Services through the tunnel started in 1994/95. 
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However, it is clear that there are two stories here. Rolling stock investment has been 
much lower in the post-privatisation environment (though the pre-privatisation data 
includes rolling stock for the Channel Tunnel). The privatisation process itself created 
considerable uncertainty which impacted on investment in the transition period (93/94 to 
95/96); and the newly privatised industry was slow to invest during the early years (from 
96/97), although investment doubled in 2000/01 compared to 1999/00. However, we note 
that the number of rolling stock units increased over the period (between 1995 and 
2000)41, and the number of train miles also increased sharply as described earlier in the 
paper. We therefore consider that the delay in rolling stock orders did not adversely affect 
the availability of services.  
On the other hand, infrastructure investment has been considerably higher after 
privatisation. Table 9 shows that, in 1999/00, infrastructure investment was almost three 
times the level of 1988/89. Furthermore, between 1995/96 and 2000/01, Railtrack was 
projected to spend around £1 billion more on renewals than was anticipated at the time of 
the Regulator’s review of access charges in 1995 (this projection was made before the 
Hatfield accident)42. Whilst the Regulator has argued that Railtrack’s investment was still 
too low, given the sharp rise in traffic growth on the network, it is far from clear that 
more investment would have been forthcoming under public ownership. It is well 
recognised that public sector cash limits led to persistent underinvestment in the rail 
network during BR’s stewardship, as table 9 shows. 
In conclusion, the evidence shows that investment has been much higher after 
privatisation than under the former BR period – especially in the key area of 
                                                 
41
 See Affuso, Angeriz and Pollitt (2002). 
42
 See Freeman and Shaw (2000), page 78. 
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infrastructure investment. Given this data, we conclude that it is very unlikely that 
investment levels would have been higher under the counterfactual scenario; and indeed, 
may have been considerably lower. We therefore expect that many of the output quality 
issues, which have arisen since privatisation, would also have occurred under continued 
public ownership (assuming the same level of traffic growth). Output quality trends are 
discussed further in Section IV.5 below. 
 
(b) Efficiency of capital investment 
 
Data on total capital expenditure is of little help in comparing the efficiency with which 
rail projects have been planned and delivered under public and private ownership. 
Furthermore, we are not aware of any academic studies which have attempted such an 
analysis. This is unsurprising, given the difficulty of making like-for-like comparisons, 
especially between large, complex projects, which make up the bulk of Railtrack’s capital 
programme. An alternative way of assessing the efficiency of capital investment (or 
project management), is to compare initial forecasts of project costs with the final 
outturn. However, this approach suffers from the problem that the final cost of a project 
may change due to many factors which are not related to efficiency (for example scope 
changes). 
A case in point, is the ongoing West Coast Main Line (WCML) upgrade project. 
This project was originally budgeted (1996) to cost £2.3bn. By the Periodic Review 
(October 2000), the estimates had increased to £5.8bn (an overrun of 150%; see table 
 40
10)43. This project is often quoted in the media as an example of the inefficiency of the 
privatised rail industry in delivering large capital projects.  
However, the majority of the cost overrun can be explained by two factors. First, the 
decision to adopt a conventional signalling strategy (after the original, more advanced 
technology had proved unworkable). Second, the re-evaluation of the renewals element of 
the programme, as Railtrack developed a better knowledge of the poor state of the track 
inherited from BR, as well as the impact of traffic growth on the network since 
privatisation. Note that the bulk of the cost increase in table 10 relates to the core, 
renewal element of the programme. It should also be noted that the original cost estimates 
for the core investment programme were prepared - and contracts signed - whilst 
Railtrack was still under public ownership (March 1996). 
 
TABLE 10 
The Estimated Cost of the  
West Coast Main Line Project 
 
Categories of expenditure 
£m 1998/99 prices 
 
1996 2000 
 
Core investment programme (renewal) 
 
Upgrade 
 
Total cost 
 
 
£ 1.5bn* 
 
£0.8bn** 
 
£2.3bn 
 
 
£3.9bn 
 
£1.9bn 
 
£5.8bn 
 
* Contracts signed in March 1996 (before the privatisation of Railtrack).  
** Contracts signed in two stages (October 1996 and June 1998). 
Source: ORR. 
 
                                                 
43
 Various, higher estimates have been made since then. 
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To put the WCML project into perspective, it is worth considering some other 
examples. Skamris and Flyvbjerg (1997) provide evidence on cost overruns for large rail 
and road projects in the UK, US and Sweden (during the last 15 years). Their study found 
that cost overruns of 50% to 100% are common; and also reported overruns on some 
projects in the range 100% to 500% (though they note that this analysis is problematic, 
since part of the overspends may be due to project rescoping).  
In respect of the former BR period, we have found little available evidence on 
forecast and final outturn costs for major projects44. The one project which we have been 
able to identify is British Rail’s investment programme in preparation for Channel Tunnel 
services (covering the period 1985/86 to 1993/94). The original estimate for the project 
was £700m (1999/00 prices), compared with the final outturn of £1.8 billion (an apparent 
overrun of around 150%)45. As with the other analyses, it is difficult to identify the 
reasons for this increase (for example, to separately identify changes in scope).  
However, we also note that four separate reports (Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, 1980, 1989, and 1991 and National Audit Office, 1985) highlighted 
concerns over the investment policies of British Rail and other nationalised industries 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, questions were raised over the impact of 
(Treasury-imposed) financial constraints, both on the level of funding (with consequent 
implications for asset condition and safety), as well as their impact on the ability of 
British Rail, and others, to develop sensible long-term plans. The reports also noted the 
failure of public sector organisations to compare project outcomes with the original plans. 
                                                 
44
 We have examined a number of sources: BR Annual Reports (1970-1974), National Audit Office, Public 
Account Committee, Select Committees (1960s onwards). 
45
 £400m and £1.56bn respectively in current prices. 
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Finally, Figure 6 shows the range of over and under-spends on a sample of all 
Railtrack projects (>£10m) completed during 2000/01 and 2001/02. These figures 
compare project outturn cost with revised budget. The revised budget takes some account 
of project scope changes, as well as the realisation of risks which were identified at the 
time that the original budgets were set. On average, these data show cost overruns of 6% 
(compared to the revised budget), though many projects came in under budget. When 
compared against the original budget or authorisation value, the average cost overrun is 
29% (though this average includes projects with overruns in excess of 1000%, which 
clearly indicate significant changes in project scope).  
 
Source: Railtrack 
 
 
In conclusion, we do not believe that there is sufficient evidence to determine 
whether (rail) capital investment is more or less efficient under public or private 
FIGURE 6
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ownership. Whilst the privatised rail industry has been criticised in this regard, it is clear 
that major problems existed under the old BR system. Evidence from other sources 
suggests that significant cost overruns, such as those observed on the Channel Tunnel and 
WCML rail projects, are common for large, complex infrastructure projects. 
 
(c) Capital substitution effects  
 
As noted above, it is possible that the operating cost savings reported in Section IV.2 are 
in part explained by capital substitution effects. However, we argue that such effects do 
not have a significant impact on our analysis. First of all, the counterfactual operating 
cost assumption is based on labour productivity and operating cost data, which itself 
would be impacted by capital substitution during the pre-privatisation period. Secondly, 
TOC initiatives have been a major driver of cost savings since privatisation (see above); 
however TOC capital investment is not significant relative to overall industry investment 
levels. Finally we note that Railtrack’s total costs (including depreciation) have fallen by 
almost the same percentage as operating costs since privatisation (6.5% compared with 
6.9% for operating costs)46. 
 
5. Output quality 
 
The previous analyses have demonstrated that privatisation has resulted in significant 
improvements in operating efficiency. Evidence has also been presented which suggests 
that the privatised rail industry has performed at least as well as BR in terms of capital 
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costs (overall investment levels and capital efficiency). However, a key question is what 
has happened to output quality. There are four quality measures which should be 
considered: train performance (delays); train crowding; asset condition (broken rails; 
track quality) and safety (accidents and signals passed at danger (SPADS)).  
To date the industry’s performance in these areas has been strongly criticised from 
many directions, particularly in the aftermath of Hatfield – and privatisation, with its 
focus on contractual regimes between disparate industry players, and the need to provide 
a return for shareholders, has often been blamed. However, looking at the pre-Hatfield 
data, it is far from clear that continued government ownership (the counterfactual) would 
have produced better results. Below we look at the four measures in turn. 
 
(a) Train performance 
 
Train performance (delay per passenger train) has improved significantly since 
privatisation (pre-Hatfield – see Figure 7 below)47. Performance improved sharply in the 
first year after privatisation (due to improvements by Railtrack), but then deteriorated 
steadily over the next three years (due to worsening train operator performance), before 
improving again in 1999/00. Overall, delays per passenger train in 1999/00 were down 
16% compared to 1995/96. The performance regimes which exist between Railtrack and 
the TOCs, and between the TOCs and OPRAF/SRA, provide rewards/penalties for 
performance above/below target. These regimes have focused management attention on 
the issue of performance.  
                                                                                                                                                 
46
 1995/96 to 1999/00.  
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Source: Railtrack. 
 
The key question is what would have happened to performance under public 
ownership, given the sharp volume growth we have seen in recent years. Of course, it is 
impossible to know for sure, though we note the absence of performance regimes under 
the old structure. However, we can gain some insight by comparing the changes in train 
performance and volume growth between 1995/96 and 1999/00 (under a privatised 
structure), with a comparable five-year period of volume growth during the boom of the 
mid-to-late 1980s (under the old BR structure). 
Table 11 shows that, since privatisation, train performance (measured by punctuality) 
has improved by 2.7%. This improvement was achieved against a background of growth 
in passenger miles and passenger train miles of 28% and 11% respectively over the 
                                                                                                                                                 
47
 We recognise that this conclusion is based on a single years’ data from 1995/96 (before Railtrack or the 
TOCs had been fully privatised). Data from earlier years is not comparable with later periods. 
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period. During a comparable period in the 1980s (1984/85 to 1988/89)48, which saw 
lower volume growth, performance actually deteriorated (see Table 12). Even if we strip 
out the sharp improvement in performance achieved in the first year of the newly 
privatised structure (1996/97), the deterioration since then only amounts to 0.6%, 
compared to 1%49 during the period of BR control in the mid 1980s – whilst volume 
growth has been much greater. 
It therefore seems unlikely that train performance would have been better under 
public ownership; indeed, the evidence suggests that it may have been considerably 
worse. 
 
TABLE 11 
Train Performance and Volume: Post-Privatisation 
 
Performance 
 
95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 Change
Punctualitya 
Pass. Train miles (m) 
Pass. Miles (bn) 
89.5% 
231 
18.6 
92.5%
229
19.9
92.5%
237
21.6
91.5%
249
22.6
91.9% 
257 
23.8 
+ 2.7% 
+ 11% 
+ 28%
(a) Percentage of trains on time. 
Sources: National Rail Trends 2000/01, Q2; Transport Trends, 2001 Edition (DTLR). 
OPRAF Annual Reports (1996/97 to 1999/00). 
 
TABLE 12 
Train Performance and Volume: BR Regime 
 
Performance 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 Change
Punctualitya 
Pass. Train miles (m) 
Pass. Miles (bn) 
90% 
202 
18.5 
89%
201
18.9
90%
203
19.2
90%
213
20.1
89% 
222 
21.3 
(1%) 
+ 10% 
+ 15%
(a) Percentage of trains on time. 
Sources: BR Annual Reports 1985/86 to 1989/90. Transport Trends, 2001 Edition 
(DTLR). 
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 This period saw sharp growth passenger miles, train miles and freight tonne-miles. 1988/89 is taken as 
the cut-off point, as passenger miles started to deteriorate after that date. 
49
 Though note that the BR data is not quoted to 1 decimal place.  
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(b) Train overcrowding 
 
Meanwhile, train overcrowding (commuter services) has got worse, with four of the ten 
train operators serving the London market experiencing excessive overcrowding in 
1999/0050. It is clear that overcrowding would also have worsened considerably under 
continued government ownership, given the unprecedented passenger growth we have 
seen (which is assumed to be exogenous in this paper).  
 
(c) Asset condition  
 
The data show that asset condition on the network has deteriorated since privatisation. 
The number of broken rails (per train mile) started to increase in the mid-1990s (see 
Figure 8 below), though fell back again by 1999/00. The Regulator has argued that 
Railtrack’s investment in track maintenance and renewal – though greater than envisaged 
when the company’s charges were set at privatisation – was insufficient, given the level 
of traffic growth. Railtrack inherited a network which had suffered from underinvestment 
for many years. As noted above, it is therefore unclear whether extra money for 
investment would have been forthcoming under government ownership. The arguments 
on asset condition are largely concerned with capital investment levels, and do not affect 
our analysis of operating costs. 
 
                                                 
50
 SRA Annual Report, 1999/00. 
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(d) Safety 
 
Finally, concerns over safety have increased since privatisation. However, the data on 
accidents do not show any statistically significant change since privatisation, as noted in 
the Health & Safety Commission “Cullen” report (2001) – written post-Hatfield:  
 
”The statistics do not bear out a picture of a declining safety trend. Professor A W 
Evans, Professor of Transport Safety at the Centre for Transport Studies at University 
College London, had made an extensive statistical analysis of the safety performance 
of the railways before and after privatisation. He concluded that safety performance 
was the same before and after privatisation”.  
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Furthermore, Figure 8 shows that signals passed at danger (SPADs)51, which are 
effectively a measure of accident risk, have fallen consistently since privatisation. Of 
course, safety statistics do not necessarily alleviate passenger concerns; nevertheless, 
there is, at present, no evidence to suggest that Britain’s railways are less safe than they 
would have been under continued public ownership. 
 
(e) Overall output quality 
 
To sum up, the pre-Hatfield data presents a mixed view on output quality since 
privatisation. Broken rails have increased, and train overcrowding has undoubtedly got 
worse. On the other hand, train performance has improved, SPADS are down, and there 
is no evidence to suggest that safety has deteriorated. However, the analysis in this paper 
is not primarily concerned with the quality position before and after privatisation, but 
rather with comparing the privatisation scenario with what would have occurred under 
continued public ownership. In this regard, we note the experience of underinvestment 
which persisted in the old BR days, and the evidence presented on train performance 
during a period of rising traffic growth in the 1980s. On this basis we argue that it is 
unlikely that output quality would have been better under the counterfactual; and may 
have been considerably worse. 
Of course train performance has deteriorated sharply since the Hatfield accident, as 
Railtrack responded by closing large parts of the network. The industry has taken a 
                                                 
51
 Measured per train mile. 
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significant financial hit as a result (a £644m provision in Railtrack’s 2000/01 results52), 
and it could be argued that these costs should be set against the savings reported earlier. It 
remains to be seen how the cost and quality measures will emerge in the coming years.  
The Regulator has argued that the large-scale closure programme, in the aftermath of 
Hatfield, was caused by the lack of an adequate asset register (and therefore knowledge 
of the condition of the company’s assets)53. However, the closure programme also 
reflects a lower risk tolerance since privatisation. This reduction has a value, though is 
difficult to quantify. Perhaps BR would not have taken the course adopted by Railtrack, 
but passengers may have faced a higher risk as a result.    
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In the aftermath of the government’s announcement (October 2001) – to place Railtrack 
into administration - attention has focused on what went wrong with privatisation, and 
how crucial network investment will be financed in future. Against this background, our 
aim has been to evaluate the operating cost efficiency gains (or losses) resulting from 
privatisation and restructuring, using a social cost-benefit analysis framework. The actual 
data used in our analysis cover the period to (financial year) 1999/00, and therefore stops 
short of the Hatfield accident. The next financial year (2000/01), which includes Hatfield, 
is not representative of the period since privatisation as a whole (and not all of the 
financial data are available in any case). We conclude that: 
                                                 
52
 This includes performance payments to train operating costs and increased depreciation costs resulting 
from Hatfield. 
53
 Much of the data on asset condition was transferred from Railtrack to the infrastructure maintenance and 
renewal companies on privatization. 
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1. Industry outputs have risen sharply since privatisation (1992/93 to 1999/00). 
Passenger train miles, passenger miles and freight tonne miles have grown by 13%, 
21% and 19% respectively. At the same time, the operating cost base has been 
reduced by 6% in real terms. As a result, unit costs have fallen sharply over the 
period, by 17% (or 2.7% per annum). After taking account of scale effects, the rail 
industry has achieved efficiency savings of 13% (or 2% per annum) since 
privatisation. 
2. The post-privatisation performance on efficiency has been significantly better than 
that achieved under public ownership. During the five years prior to privatisation, unit 
costs went up by approximately 1% per annum (after stripping out the impact of scale 
effects). However, for our central scenario, we have assumed counterfactual 
efficiency savings of 1% per annum.  
3. In the central scenario, privatisation and restructuring has generated efficiency 
savings to date of about £800m, compared to the counterfactual of continued public 
ownership. The savings, achieved over only four years, are more than offset by 
restructuring costs. However, assuming that the savings achieved to date are rolled 
forward into the future (though declining to zero over 15 years as the public sector 
catches up), the total savings rise to £2.5bn under the central scenario (pre-
restructuring), or £1.1bn after restructuring costs. We note that the savings reported 
here are sensitive to the counterfactual cost assumption54.  
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 The results are also sensitive to the assumptions concerning the level of fixed costs in the industry, 
though we consider that we have built in sufficient scale economies into our calculation.  
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4. Consumers have benefited considerably from privatisation (£1.2bn) – indeed by more 
than the level of savings. Table 7 shows that, as a result, producers and government 
together lose £100m, with the government losing £300m, whilst producers gain 
£200m. 
5. We argue that output quality is no lower (and is probably better) than it would have 
been under continued public ownership (pre-Hatfield). This conclusion is based on 
the experience of persistent underinvestment under BR’s stewardship of the network, 
and the deterioration in train performance which occurred following the sharp traffic 
growth during the 1980s. Despite concerns over safety, the Cullen report – written 
after the Hatfield accident - found safety performance to be (statistically) the same 
before and after privatisation. Furthermore, SPAD data show a continued trend of 
improvement since privatisation, suggesting lower accident risk. 
Of course, post-Hatfield, train performance has worsened dramatically, and the 
industry has taken a significant financial hit as a result (£644m). This position resulted 
partly from the lack of an adequate asset register, which led Railtrack to close down large 
parts of the network. However, it also reflects a reduction in risk tolerance since 
privatisation. Whilst British Rail may not have taken the same action as Railtrack, 
passengers may have been subjected to higher risk as a result. The value of this reduced 
risk is often ignored and is difficult to quantify. 
Looking forward, the achievement of further efficiencies in the future will be key to 
delivering the government’s objective to improve rail services. This paper finds that a 
privatised structure, where shareholders demand a return on their investment, has led to 
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significant improvements in operating efficiency - it remains to be seen whether the new 
regime, with a not-for-profit infrastructure owner, will deliver the same efficiency 
improvements.  
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APPENDIX A 
CALCULATION OF INDUSTRY COSTS 
 
Costs before privatisation (up to 1992/93) 
 
Costs after privatisation (1996/97 onwards) 
 
For the period prior to privatisation, industry 
operating costs are taken direct from the BR 
accounts: 
 
x The starting point for determining industry 
costs is BR’s operating costs before 
exceptional items (the latter includes 
restructuring and severance costs – these are 
included separately in our analysis within 
R&P costs). 
 
x Depreciation is subtracted, to obtain 
operating costs before depreciation; 
 
x The amortisation of deferred grant income 
(ie. the amount of capital grant released to 
the P&L to cover depreciation costs), which 
appears as a negative cost, is also taken out 
(therefore increasing costs to their true 
level). 
 
x EU and level crossing grants are added back 
(again, these appear as negative costs). 
 
x Note that Channel Tunnel costs were 
capitalised, and therefore had no impact on 
operating costs. However the pre-
privatisation data do contain some costs in 
respect of Union Railways (planning costs 
for the high-speed rail link between London 
and the Channel Tunnel). These costs have 
not been stripped out since we expect that 
similar costs are currently being incurred on 
large projects (for example, WCML) and 
are being absorbed within operating costs in 
the post-privatisation data. 
 
For the period after privatisation, costs are calculated 
as follows: 
 
x Total industry operating profits (pre-
depreciation) are subtracted from total final 
revenue from customers/funders.  
 
x Total final revenue is derived by adding the 
revenues (including subsidy) for all 25 
TOCs, plus the two largest freight 
operators, EWS and Freightliner. In 
addition, other Railtrack revenue is also 
added (this is property income, which 
would have previously been received by 
BR. It also includes a small amount of grant 
income). Open-access revenue (Channel 
Tunnel and Heathrow Express) is excluded 
(did not exist under BR – and is not 
included in the volume data used to 
calculate unit costs).  
 
x Industry profits are taken as the sum of 
TOC, freight operator, ROSCO and 
Railtrack operating profits. The profit data 
exclude depreciation, exceptional items 
(restructuring) and profits from any asset 
sales. As for the BR data, any grants 
included as negative costs are added back.  
 
x As noted in the main report, the profit data 
do not take account of the profits made by 
the many supplier companies providing 
services to the industry (particularly the 
infrastructure maintenance and renewal 
companies). To this extent, post-
privatisation costs are over-estimated, and 
therefore savings underestimated. However, 
the post-privatisation data exclude the costs 
of minor freight operators. The costs of the 
Strategic Rail Authority are included. 
Residual BR costs have not been added to 
the post-privatisation costs (see section III.2 
above). 
 
x The Railtrack Asset Maintenance Plan 
(AMP) charge is treated as depreciation 
(this treatment was formally adopted by the 
company in 1997/98). 
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APPENDIX B 
COMPARING PRE- AND POST-PRIVATISATION DATA 
 
The following table compares the cost base in 1993/94 with 1994/95, following the 
creation of Railtrack. During this year, it is often reported that the revenue subsidy 
doubled – and this fact is used to discredit the privatisation process. However, the cost 
(before depreciation) increased by only 1.6% in nominal terms (and actually fell in real 
terms). The step change in subsidy in 1994/95 can be explained largely by two factors: 
1. in preparation for privatisation, the financial flows were restructured to allow each 
element of the business to earn a commercial return (the government captured these 
returns through sales proceeds); and  
2. on its formation in 1994/95, Railtrack introduced a new method of accounting55 for 
maintenance and renewals expenditure, in line with other regulated industries (e.g.. 
BAA and Water Companies) 56.  
 
                                                 
55
 Asset Plan Maintenance (AMP). See Railtrack Annual Reports. 
56
 See Bradshaw & Lawton-Smith (2000), page 114-115. Previously, BR had accounted for this cost on a 
“pay-as-you-go” basis (and the investment in maintenance and renewal had been insufficient to maintain 
the network in steady-state in the years prior to privatisation).  
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Industry Costs  
(£m current prices) 
1993/94 1994/95 
  BR Railtrack Consol. Total
 
Staff costs 
Materials, supplies/services 
Other external charges 
Own work capitaliseda 
Access charges 
Otherb 
Total before depreciation 
 
Depreciation (inc. AMP) 
 
Total cost 
 
 
2,493
1,119
-
(253)
-
50
3,409
292
3,701
2,149
1,157
-
(22) 
2169
19
5,472
169
5,641
287
5
1,215
(61) 
-
(46) 
1,400
576
1,976
 
- 
- 
(1,238) 
- 
(2,169) 
- 
(3,407) 
 
- 
 
(3,407) 
 
2,436
1,162
(23) 
(83) 
-
(27) 
3,465
745
4,210
 
(a) Includes other operating income 
(b) Includes other adjustments to reflect grants included as negative income, and stripping out of 
privatisation costs within Railtrack. 
 
Sources: British Rail Annual Reports, 1993/94 and 1994/95; Railtrack Annual Report 
1994/95. 
 
 
 
The table also shows that the increase in cost (and hence subsidy) was driven by a rise in 
depreciation resulting from a change in accounting policy as explained above. Since other 
(non-depreciation) costs remained broadly the same, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the change in accounting policy led to any transfer of costs between operating and capital 
expenditure.  
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APPENDIX C 
KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF THE SOCIAL COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS  
 
The key assumptions are summarised in this appendix.  
 
 Period to date (to 1999/00) Projections (15 years) 
 Privatisation 
(actual) 
Public ownership 
(counterfactual) 
 
Operating costs See Appendix A 1992/93 cost base 
projected forward based 
on assumptions 
concerning scale effects, 
and three different 
scenarios for underlying 
efficiency gains. 
The efficiency gap 
opened up by the 
privatisation scenario is 
assumed to be closed in 
a linear fashion over the 
next 15 years. 
Restructuring costs All restructuring costs 
included from 1993/94 to 
1999/00 (both costs 
incurred by BR, and 
privatised companies). 
None No further restructuring 
costs assumed in the 
projections. 
Prices Calculated as total TOC 
and Freight operator 
revenue divided by a 
composite volume index, 
based on passenger miles 
and freight tonne-miles. 
Price trends calculated 
from BR revenue and 
volume data are 
extrapolated forward 
from the 1993/94 base 
to 1999/00. 
The price advantage (ie 
lower prices) generated 
by the privatisation 
scenario is assumed to 
be closed in a linear 
fashion over 15 years. 
Subsidies Actual data taken from 
National Rail Trends 
(2000/01, Q2), SRA.  
 
. 
 
 
Assumes that the 
government would pay 
revenue subsidies equal 
to operating losses. Also 
assumes that the 
government would 
continue to cover capital 
costs (see below), at the 
average level over the 5 
years before 
privatisation (£1.1bn per 
annum).  
Actual scenario 
continues at the 1999/00 
level. The counterfactual 
level of revenue 
subsidies gradually 
changes as cost 
efficiencies and price 
reductions feed through 
over 15 years (see 
above). 
Capital costs Ignored in the analysis, except in calculating the 
change in welfare between government and 
producers. Since the counterfactual assumes that the 
government would have continued to invest £1.1bn 
per annum to fund capital costs, we assume that the 
private sector would also need to provide this same 
amount of funding under the privatisation scenario 
(no capital savings assumed). 
Continues at 1999/00 
levels for fifteen years. 
Volumes Actual data taken from 
National Rail Trends 
(2000/01, Q2), SRA. 
 
Volume growth 
assumed to be same as 
for the privatisation 
scenario. 
No further volume 
growth assumed. 
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Company Accounts and Reports 
 
Angel Trains     1996/97 to 1999/00 
British Railways Board   1985/86 to 1995/96  
English, Welsh and Scottish Railways57  1996/97 to 1999/00 
Eversholt     1996/97 to 1998/99 
Porterbrook     1996/97 to 1999/00 
Railtrack      1994/95 to 1999/00 
Train Operating Companies58   1996/97 to 1999/00 
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 Note that data for Freightliner taken from the company’s web site (for 1998/99 and 1999/00 only). 
58
 As noted in the notes to Table 2, data for some TOCs is not available for 1999/00. 
